In Darwall and another v Dartmoor National Park Authority [2025] UKSC 20 (21 May 2025), the Supreme Court unanimously upheld the public’s right to “wild camp” on the Dartmoor Commons (“the Commons”). Although the judgment only concerns Dartmoor, which is subject to specific legislation, it has rekindled a wider debate about public rights of access to nature across England and Wales.
The case itself turned on a narrow point – whether section 10(1) of the Dartmoor Commons Act 1985 (“the 1985 Act”) confers on the public a right to pitch tents or otherwise camp overnight on the Commons – but the judgment provides a helpful illustration, of broader interest to practitioners, of the court’s approach to statutory interpretation. In addition, it contains a reminder of the circumstances in which the Attorney General should be joined as a party to proceedings which involve contested rights of a public nature.
Background
The Dartmoor Commons (“the Commons”) are areas of unenclosed moorland within the Dartmoor National Park. They are privately owned but can be used by other locals for livestock. In 2022, Mr and Mrs Darwall, the owners of an estate on Dartmoor, issued proceedings against the Dartmoor National Park Authority (“DNPA”). They were concerned about the potential harm caused by camping and sought a declaration that section 10(1) of the 1985 Act does not grant the public a right to camp on the Commons.
At first instance, the Chancellor of the High Court found in the Darwalls’ favour ([2023] EWHC 35 (Ch)). DNPA appealed successfully to the Court of Appeal ([2023] EWCA Civ 927), following which the Darwalls appealed to the Supreme Court. Permission to intervene was granted to the Open Spaces Society, Britain's oldest national conservation body.
The arguments
The parties advanced conflicting interpretations of section 10(1) of the 1985 Act, which provides:
“Subject to the provisions of this Act and compliance with all rules, regulations or byelaws relating to the commons and for the time being in force, the public shall have a right of access to the commons on foot and on horseback for the purpose of open-air recreation…..” (emphasis added)
The Darwalls argued that the right of access was qualified: the “open-air recreation” had to be of a kind carried out on foot or horseback and did not include activities which involved ceasing walking or riding (such as setting up a tent) (§16). In contrast, DNPA and the Open Spaces Society argued that the words “on foot and on horseback” referred to the means by which the public have to access the Commons in order to benefit from the right bestowed by section 10(1).
Judgment
In a judgment jointly authored by Lord Sales and Lord Stephens (with whom Lord Reed, Lady Rose and Lady Simler agreed), the Supreme Court held that the language of section 10(1) was unambiguous and included a right to wild camp on the Commons.
Ordinary meaning and context
The Court began by observing that the normal principles of statutory interpretation applied, which required the courts to “ascertain the meaning of the words used in a statute in the light of their context and the purpose of the statutory provision” (§15). It referred to Lord Hodge’s judgment in R (Project for the Registration of Children as British Citizens) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2023] AC 255, in which he said that “a phrase or passage must be read in the context of the section as a whole and in the wider context of a relevant group of sections”, and “other provisions in a statute and the statute as a whole may provide the relevant context.”
Starting with the wording of section 10(1) itself, there were a number of indications that wild camping by individuals who enter on foot or horseback is “made a matter of entitlement by that provision” (§17). As a matter of ordinary language, camping was a form of “open-air recreation”, and section 10(1) therefore conferred a right of access to the Commons for the purpose of camping. Furthermore, the words “on foot and on horseback” described the means by which a person accessed the Commons (i.e. they did not qualify the type of recreation that could be enjoyed). The Court agreed with Underhill LJ that it would be absurd to interpret section 10(1) as excluding activities such as having a picnic, birdwatching or sketching, and the same reasoning applied to camping.
For these and other reasons, it was possible to arrive at a “clear understanding of the true meaning of section 10(1) by focusing on its wording”. That understanding was reinforced by the Court’s analysis of other provisions within the 1985 Act and the wider legislative context.
Other aids to statutory interpretation
Hansard
The Court went on to consider whether the Darwalls could rely on statements in Hansard to support their interpretation. They had argued that the material was admissible (i) under the rule in Pepper v Hart; and (ii) on the basis that they could be used to identify the context of the legislation and the mischief it seeks to address. The Court disagreed. First, the statements were not admissible under the rule in Pepper v Hart because there was no ambiguity in the 1985 Act (ambiguity, obscurity or absurdity being a condition of admissibility). Secondly, the Court did not agree that there was an alternative basis for admitting parliamentary statements (distinct from the rule in Pepper v Hart) (§39-43).
The principle of legality
The Darwalls also sought to rely on the principle of legality, arguing that their right to protect their private property by bringing actions in trespass “could only be restricted by clear statutory words showing that Parliament has squarely confronted what it was doing and accepted the political cost.” (§44). The Court found that as there was no ambiguity in the 1985 Act, the principle did not assist. In addition, the Court observed that the 1985 Act, while restricting the rights of property owners, also granted advantages in return (such as giving the DNPA the power to regulate the use of the Commons) – the implication being that Parliament had in fact considered the protection of property rights (the Court noting that such public regulation was likely to be more effective than private law actions).
The Hobhouse reports
The Darwalls relied upon two reports of committees which had led to the National Parks and Access to the Countryside Act 1949 (pursuant to which Dartmoor had been designated as a National Park). The Court concluded that they did not assist as they a) did not inform the construction of either the 1949 Act or the 1985 Act and b) the 1985 Act did not implement either of the reports (§51).
Byelaws
Finally, the Court rejected DNPA’s reliance on local byelaws, noting that whilst in some circumstances subordinate legislation made pursuant to statutory powers could be an aid to interpretation, this was not permissible here because the byelaws were not made around the same time as the 1985 Act, and were not drafted by or on the instructions of the government department responsible for the Act (§53).
Representation of the public
In addition, the Court made some interesting observations about the role of the Attorney General in proceedings involving a dispute about the public’s legal rights (§54-59). It considered that the High Court’s declaration that section 10(1) “does not confer on the public
any right to pitch tents or otherwise make camp overnight on Dartmoor Commons” (emphasis added) should not have been made when the Attorney General had not been joined as a party to represent the public. The DNPA was not an authorised government department and did not represent the public.
Comment
The Dartmoor Commons is the only place in England and Wales where the public have a right to wild camp. While the Land Reform (Scotland) Act 2003 provides a right to wild camp over most of the non-enclosed land in Scotland, there is no equivalent in England and Wales.
Success in this case is likely to provide further impetus to the “right to roam” movement spearheaded by campaigning organisations such as Right to Roam, The Ramblers and the Open Spaces Society, and some Labour backbenchers are now calling on the government to extend access to nature. This growing movement will inevitably face push back from landowners, utility operators and, in some cases, public authorities. Legal action of different hues in this space (ranging from civil claims to judicial review and third-party interventions) is likely to grow.
For practitioners, the judgment provides a useful example of the Supreme Court applying the principles of statutory interpretation, mindful of the constitutional limitations on their role. In a lecture delivered to the Statute Law Society Conference on 6 June 2025, Lord Sales suggested that there is a methodology (“already inherent in the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence”) which enables the court “to identify more accurately the meaning Parliament intended to convey by its use of the language in a statute and avoids the courts usurping the legislative function” (p.4). The starting point “is the words and the court then moves through the hierarchy of different sources of meaning and purpose, in an iterative approach to identify the specific meaning as intended by Parliament” (p.12). Notably, Lord Sales used several aspects of the Court’s reasoning in the Dartmoor case to illustrate the court’s methodology. In concluding, he suggested that “while there are legitimate concerns and problems that purposive interpretation must face up to, these concerns have been mitigated by the careful, iterative methodology that has been developed by the courts.”
About the authors
Sahil is a senior associate in the public law team. His practice covers all aspects of public law from judicial reviews to public inquiries, with particular expertise in environmental and climate change judicial reviews, planning challenges, human rights-based challenges, and public procurement litigation.
Caitlín is a Trainee Solicitor at Kingsley Napley and is currently in her second seat with the Public Law team. She joined the firm in September 2024.
Andrea joined the public law team as a Professional Support Lawyer in March 2024. Andrea practised for many years as a barrister from a leading civil and public law chambers, following which she took a maternity career break. Whilst at the Bar, she developed particular expertise in public law and human rights (including judicial review and damages claims), professional discipline, inquests and indirect tax.
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